Hey, Neighbor: Homeowners’ Associations, Super-Priority Liens, and the Need for Balanced Rights in Nevada by Crooker, Rebecca
19 NEV. L.J. 313, CROOKER 3/24/2019  5:10 PM 
 
313 
HEY, NEIGHBOR: HOMEOWNERS’ 
ASSOCIATIONS, SUPER-PRIORITY LIENS, 
AND THE NEED FOR BALANCED RIGHTS IN 
NEVADA 
Rebecca Crooker* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................  314 
 I. ALL HAIL UNIFORMITY: THE HISTORY OF HOMEOWNERS’ 
ASSOCIATIONS IN AMERICA ................................................................  314 
 A. Let’s Get Our Act Together: The Creation and 
Implementation of the Uniform Common Interest Ownership 
Act ...............................................................................................  318 
 1. Condominiums ......................................................................  318 
 2. Planned Developments .........................................................  319 
 3. Cooperatives .........................................................................  319 
 4. Consolidation ........................................................................  320 
 B. Everyone Has to Pay Their Dues: Unpaid Assessments and 
the Super-Priority Lien ...............................................................  321 
 II. THE COURTS SPLIT: NEVADA AND THE SUPER-PRIORITY LIEN ..........  323 
 A. The Judicial System Provides Clarity? .......................................  328 
 III. BANKS HAVE RIGHTS. HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS HAVE 
RIGHTS. WHAT ABOUT THE HOMEOWNERS? ......................................  330 
 A. HOAs Gone Wild .........................................................................  332 
 B. Hands in the Cookie Jar ..............................................................  333 
 C. No More Block Parties ................................................................  334 
 IV. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? ........................................................  336 
 A. The Path Forward is Paved with Legislation..............................  336 
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................  338 
                                                        
*  Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2019, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Neva-
da, Las Vegas. Thank you to my amazing husband, Chris, for his unwavering encouragement 
and support, and for inspiring me to write about this topic. Thank you to my mother for 
teaching me the “three Rs” and more importantly, for teaching me how to work hard and to 
persevere. Lastly, thank you to Professor Linda Edwards, for teaching me what a powerful 
and beautiful tool legal writing can be. 
19 NEV. L.J. 313, CROOKER 3/24/2019  5:10 PM 
314 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:1  
 
INTRODUCTION 
“Houses are built to live in, and not to look on, therefore let use be preferred 
before uniformity, except where both may be had.”—Francis Bacon1 
Common-Interest communities and Homeowners’ Associations (“HOAs”) 
are as much a part of American history as Ford Motors. Initially created as a 
space for the elite to reside, common-interest communities soon gained popu-
larity as a pleasant and affordable living option for lower-income families.2 
Over time, the option to purchase a home not regulated by a homeowners’ as-
sociation has become severely limited. In 2016, the number of homeowners’ 
associations in the United States was estimated to be 342,000.3 
With the rise of the homeowners’ associations has come a complex set of 
problems. Nevada specifically has struggled to determine where the boundaries 
of power lie, as HOA-initiated foreclosures have risen exponentially since the 
Great Recession.4 The foreclosure epidemic shines a spotlight on the imbalance 
of power that exists between homeowners’ associations and the homeowner. 
The Covenants, Conditions, & Restrictions (CC&Rs) that bind homeowners’ 
associations often give a small group of people nearly unlimited power to im-
pose whatever restrictions they deem necessary.5 These restrictions can infringe 
on even the most intimate details of a resident’s life.6 
This article will examine the imbalance of power between homeowners’ 
associations and homeowners, and how the super-priority epidemic in Nevada 
is a symptom of this imbalance. Part I will examine the history of homeowners’ 
associations in the United States before turning to an examination of the unique 
problems faced by Nevada in Part II. Part III will discuss the stark imbalance in 
power between the associations and homeowners. Part IV will discuss solutions 
to correct the imbalance of power in Nevada and restore homeowners’ associa-
tions to the role that they were originally designed to fulfill. 
I. ALL HAIL UNIFORMITY: THE HISTORY OF HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS 
IN AMERICA 
In modern America, homeowners’ associations are as much a fixture in the 
suburban setting as the corner Starbucks. However, they are a relatively recent 
                                                        
1  FRANCIS BACON, ESSAYS CIVIL AND MORAL 141 (Cassell & Company Ltd. 1905). 
2  See infra Part I. 
3  CMTY. ASS’NS INST., NATIONAL AND STATE STATISTICAL REVIEW FOR 2016 COMMUNITY 
ASSOCIATION DATA 1 (2016), https://foundation.caionline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/2 
016StatsReviewFBWeb.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LAD-V97F] [hereinafter CAI REPORT] 
(showing increase in number of HOAs from 1970 to 2016). 
4  Kylee Gloeckner, Note, Nevada’s Foreclosure Epidemic: Homeowner Associations’ Su-
per-Priority Liens Not So “Super” for Some, 15 NEV. L.J. 326, 326–27 (2014). 
5  Paula A. Franzese, Privatization and Its Discontents: Common Interest Communities and 
the Rise of Government for “the Nice,” 37 URB. LAW. 335, 336 (2005). 
6  See infra Section III.A. 
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phenomenon and their rise to prominence and power has been meteoric.7 Alt-
hough HOAs do provide certain benefits to the neighborhood, such as protect-
ing property values and providing residents with common spaces, their gov-
ernmental structure also serves to deprive the homeowner of certain liberties 
traditionally possessed by property owners.8 
American property law evolved from the English legal tradition, where an 
individual possessing property in fee simple absolute was free to do whatever 
he wished with his land.9 A property owner could sell his land it, build on it, 
and assign a portion or all of his interests to another person.10 As property law 
evolved, the use of “covenants” came to be frequently utilized in expanding 
neighborhoods.11 A covenant could restrict land to be used only for certain pur-
poses, and in some cases, covenants imposed restrictions upon land for the 
foreseeable future.12 Originally, an individual could only enforce a restrictive 
covenant while maintaining ownership of the parcel bound by the covenant, but 
developers soon began to search for a solution that would allow them to impose 
and enforce covenants, despite selling all ownership interests.13 Enter home-
owners’ associations.14 
Homeowners’ associations were organizations created by developers for 
the purpose of enforcing covenants, as well as promulgating new rules as the 
need arose.15 One of the first cases to formally recognize the power of a home-
owners’ association was Neponsit Property Owners’ Association v. Emigrant 
Industrial Savings Bank, in which the court held that a covenant requiring 
homeowners to pay fees for the purpose of maintaining common areas did 
“ ‘touch or concern’ the land.”16 The obligation to pay fees would therefore 
pass to future owners and was enforceable by the HOA.17 
During their inception, HOAs were connected with the development of 
wealthy communities. However, after the Great Depression, the Federal Hous-
ing Administration and the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation made it possible 
                                                        
7  See CAI REPORT, supra note 3, at 1 (showing increase in number of HOAs from 1970 to 
2016). 
8  See David L. Callies et al., Ramapo Looking Forward: Gated Communities, Covenants, 
and Concerns, 35 URB. LAW. 177, 184 (2003). 
9  Paul Boudreaux, Homes, Rights, and Private Communities, 20 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
479, 483 n.13 (2009). 
10  Id. 
11  Id. at 484. 
12  See Id. (discussing Tulk v. Moxhay, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Chanc. 1848)). 
13  Id. at 485. 
14  Id. 
15  Id. 
16  Id. (quoting Neponsit Prop. Owners’ Ass’n v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793 
(N.Y. 1938)). 
17  See Neponsit Prop. Owners’ Ass’n, 15 N.E.2d at 798. 
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for lower-income individuals to obtain financing for homes.18 This in turn led 
to the rise of planned communities for the “average” American.19 After World 
War II, large residential communities became the norm, and from 1940 to 
1960, homeownership increased from 44 percent to 62 percent.20 These new 
developments incorporated restrictive covenants dictating how homeowners 
could use their property, as famously illustrated by Abraham Levitt—one such 
developer who fined homeowners for failing to properly maintain their lawns.21 
During the 1960s and 1970s, prospective homeowners realized that by pooling 
their resources with others in the community, they could enjoy amenities they 
would otherwise be unable to afford.22 This attraction contributed to the rise of 
common-interest communities, such as condominiums, co-ops, and planned 
unit developments (“PUDs”).23 The power of the restrictive covenant also al-
lowed homeowners to control the type of individual that could purchase in their 
neighborhood.24 Racially restrictive covenants became popular in neighbor-
hoods where Caucasian individuals wanted to maintain the white-washed aes-
thetics of their communities.25 
Over time, the HOAs’ self-governing role caused it to be embraced by lo-
cal municipalities as well as the State.26 Because the HOA dictates the behavior 
and appearance of its community, it theoretically maintains the property value 
of the community’s homes.27 After the 1970s, mortgage securitization provided 
the dual advantage of allowing investors access to mortgage markets as a po-
tential investment as well as giving lenders increased liquidity.28 This devel-
opment has decreased the autonomy that a homeowner once had—today, the 
homeowner is tied to a global market, which in turn shapes the community in 
which he lives.29 
While the HOAs’ rise in popularity was partially due to the image of stabil-
ity and a homogeny that was appealing to many, today a potential homeowner 
often lacks a choice in whether to reside in an HOA community.30 In 1970, 2.1 
                                                        
18  See Boudreaux, supra note 9, at 486; James Fraser et al., The Privatization of Neighbor-
hood Governance and the Production of Urban Space, 48 ENV’T & PLAN. 844, 847 (2016). 
19  See Boudreaux, supra note 9, at 486. 
20  Priya S. Gupta, Governing the Single-Family House: A (Brief) Legal History, 37 U. HAW. 
L. REV. 187, 197 (2015). 
21  Fraser et al., supra note 18, at 847. 
22  UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT prefatory note at 6 (1982) (NAT’L CONFERENCE 
COMM’RS UNIF. STATE LAWS, amended 2014) [hereinafter UCIOA]. 
23  Id. 
24  Boudreaux, supra note 9, at 486–87. 
25  Id. 
26  See Fraser et al., supra note 18, at 848. 
27  See Callies et al., supra note 8, at 180–81. 
28  Fraser et al., supra note 18, at 848. 
29  Id. 
30  See CAI REPORT, supra note 3, at 1 (illustrating the number of homeowners’ associations 
in 2016 as opposed to 1970). 
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million American residents lived in 10,000 community associations.31 By 2016, 
69 million residents lived in 342,000 community associations.32 Some cities are 
so reliant on HOAs to maintain individual communities that they refuse to issue 
permits to developers who have not filed for an application to create CC&Rs 
and a homeowners’ association.33 As a result, most new residential develop-
ments involve a homeowners’ association.34 And, as HOAs have increased in 
prominence, they have also increased in power.35 Often, the increase in power 
gives rise to an increase in problems. 
Originally the CC&Rs resembled zoning laws and governed issues such as 
whether developments would be limited to single-family homes and whether 
they could contain both one and two-story residences.36 However, CC&Rs to-
day govern a much broader swath of issues.37 HOAs, although regulated by the 
state, are not governmental organizations and consequently lack the restrictions 
that bind public entities.38 As long as the HOA board is “in accordance” with 
the original CC&Rs, an HOA is free to promulgate additional rules.39 An HOA 
may govern what color a homeowner may paint their house, whether they may 
have a reduced-water landscape, whether they can put a “for-sale” sign in front 
of their house, what type of pets are allowed, and even the type of curtains 
hanging indoors.40 While undoubtedly there are some that look askance at their 
neighbors and give thanks that Cousin Eddie won’t be able to pull up in the RV 
and dump the contents into the sewer,41 the fact remains that homeowners are 
severely limited as to how they can use their property. 
In addition to imposing restrictions, HOAs have various methods of en-
forcing rules. Some communities utilize a stern letter or a targeted warning in 
the weekly newsletter, while other associations freely dispense fines in re-
                                                        
31  Id. 
32  Id. 
33  Fraser et al., supra note 18, at 848. 
34  See Lisa J. Chadderdon, No Political Speech Allowed: Common Interest Developments, 
Homeowners Associations, and Restrictions on Free Speech, 21 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 
233, 236–37 (2006). 
35  See infra Section III.A. 
36  See Boudreaux, supra note 9, at 491. 
37  Id. (“The covenants in the experimental days of Tulk and Neponsit addressed only funda-
mental matters, such as assuring that the land remained residential and that payments be 
made to support the HOA and common areas. Today, however, sets of HOA covenants have 
grown increasingly complex and have intruded more deeply into the ‘castle’ of the home-
owner.”). 
38  Id. at 493. 
39  Id. 
40  Barbara Holland, Homeowner Blocked from Posting For-Sale Sign, LAS VEGAS REV. J. 
(Dec. 20, 2015 5:05 AM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/homes/resale-news/homeowner-b 
locked-from-posting-for-sale-sign/ [https://perma.cc/C4DS-CFJ5]; see Boudreaux, supra 
note 9, at 509 (discussing amendment of Florida state code to allow homeowners to have a 
reduced-water landscape); Franzese, supra note 5, at 336. 
41  See NATIONAL LAMPOON’S CHRISTMAS VACATION (Warner Bros. 1989). 
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sponse to actual or perceived violations.42 These fines can pile up and—in 
some jurisdictions—allow the association to foreclose on the home without ju-
dicial approval, assuming first-lien position over the lending bank.43 Initially 
proposed in the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act, these “super-
priority liens” have been heavily litigated with a number of different results.44 
A. Let’s Get Our Act Together: The Creation and Implementation of the 
Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act 
In order to understand the legal power that HOAs today possess, it is best 
to start with a historical understanding of the laws that govern them, specifical-
ly: the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (UCIOA).45 The National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws passed the UCIOA in 
1982, after nine years of research and drafting.46 
Prior to the UCIOA, condominiums were highly regulated by state statutes 
which typically lacked adequate consumer protection provisions.47 Co-
operatives and planned developments were regulated less stringently, and the 
governing laws often contained confusing language and misused terms, giving 
property owners different “bundles of rights” and causing difficulties for lend-
ers attempting to assess the best method of financing for a particular state.48 
1. Condominiums 
The first uniform act—the Uniform Condominium Act—was adopted by 
the Conference in 1977.49 Prior to 1977, many states modeled their statutes af-
ter Puerto Rico’s 1958 statute concerning condominium governance, or the 
1962 Federal Housing Administration’s model condominium statute.50 Howev-
er, these statutes proved inadequate as condominiums gained in popularity, due 
to the notable absence of consumer protection provisions and lack of flexibility 
governing the use and creation of condominiums.51 States, responding to these 
concerns, drafted a second-generation of statutes, which soon proved to high-
light other areas lacking in regulation.52 Furthermore, states varied widely in 
                                                        
42  Franzese, supra note 5, at 342; Daniel Goldmintz, Note, Lien Priorities: The Defects of 
Limiting the “Super Priority” for Common Interest Communities, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 267, 
283 (2011). 
43  Gloeckner, supra note 4, at 330. 
44  See infra Section I.B. 
45  UCIOA prefatory note at 6 (1982) (NAT’L CONFERENCE COMM’RS UNIF. STATE LAWS, 
amended 2014). 
46  Id. 
47  Id. at 7. 
48  Id. at 6. 
49  Id. at 7–8. 
50  Id. at 7. 
51  Id. 
52  Id. 
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their language and interpretations, causing the Conference to adopt the Uniform 
Condominium Act (“UCA”).53 
2. Planned Developments 
The Conference adopted the second uniform act—the Uniformed Planned 
Community Act—in 1980.54 Planned communities were partially a by-product 
of zoning laws intended to maximize available land by clustering together new 
housing.55 Because these planned communities emerged from local govern-
ments and zoning ordinances, rather than state statutes, they operated for years 
under common law.56 However, common law was unable to address all of the 
regulatory issues and consumer protection concerns that statutes were address-
ing for condominiums.57 Developers also began to favor planned communities 
over condominiums in order to avoid the disclosure and escrow requirements, 
as well as restricted practices associated with the regulated condominiums.58 
Furthermore, lack of regulation meant that the HOAs that emerged with these 
planned communities came in all shapes and sizes. In response, the Uniform 
Planned Act, closely modeling the Uniform Condominium Act, was adopted.59 
3. Cooperatives 
The third Uniform Act adopted by the Conference was the Model Real Es-
tate Cooperative Act, adopted in 1981.60 In 1978, the Conference decided that 
the Uniform Planned Community Act and the Uniform Condominium Act 
should be identical whenever possible, envisioning a future where the two Acts 
would be consolidated.61 Thus, the Model Real Estate Cooperative Act mir-
rored the two prior Acts wherever possible.62 The Conference drafted the Act 
with the goal of providing lenders, developers, and consumers a “coherent and 
consistent pattern of rights and obligations applicable to all ‘common interest’ 
developments, whether organized as condominiums, planned communities or 
cooperatives.”63 
                                                        
53  Id. 
54  Id. 
55  Id. 
56  Id. 
57  Id. 
58  Id. at 8. 
59  Id. 
60  Id. 
61  Id. 
62  Id. 
63  Id. 
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4. Consolidation 
The Conference’s adoption of the UCIOA consolidated the three prior Acts 
and added generic definitions.64 The “condominium” was defined as a com-
mon-interest community where “portions of the real estate are designated for 
separate ownership and the remainder of the real estate is designated for com-
mon ownership solely by the owners of those portions.”65 The “cooperative” 
was defined as a common-interest community where “the real estate is owned 
by an association, each of whose members is entitled by virtue of his ownership 
interest in the association to exclusive possession of a unit.”66 “Planned com-
munity” was meant to include any type of common-interest community that 
was not a condominium or cooperative.67 Most importantly, the “common-
interest community” definition stated that “ ‘[c]ommon-[i]nterest [c]ommunity’ 
means real estate with respect to which any person, by virtue of his ownership 
of a unit, is obligated to pay for real estate taxes, insurance premiums, mainte-
nance or improvement of other real estate described in a declaration.”68 
The language and section numbering of the UCIOA followed its predeces-
sors as much as possible, but important differences between the Acts were pre-
served when necessary.69 The result was designed to offer states choices when 
considering legislation for common-interest communities.70 States desiring to 
implement legislation touching all common-interest communities could adopt 
the UCIOA.71 States wanting to regulate for the first time or to modernize their 
regulations regarding condominiums, cooperatives, or planned communities 
were able to adopt one of the earlier acts.72 Furthermore, the drafters wrote with 
the intent that a state having previously adopted one of the three original acts 
could, with few amendments, adopt the UCIOA, thereby extending coverage to 
all forms of community ownership.73 
The important components of the UCIOA’s definition of the common-
interest community were (1) a “unit” must exist within the common-interest 
community that is a both a physical piece of the real estate and designed for 
                                                        
64  Norman Geis, Beyond the Condominium: The Uniform Common-Interest Ownership Act, 
17 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 757, 758–59 (1982). 
65  Id. at 760 (quoting UCIOA § 1-103(8) (1982) (NAT’L CONFERENCE COMM’RS UNIF. STATE 
LAWS, amended 2014)). 
66  Id. (quoting UCIOA § 1-103(10) (1982) (NAT’L CONFERENCE COMM’RS UNIF. STATE 
LAWS, amended 2014)). 
67  Id. at 761. 
68  Id. at 759 (quoting UCIOA § 1-103(7) (1982) (NAT’L CONFERENCE COMM’RS UNIF. STATE 
LAWS, amended 2014)). 
69  UCIOA prefatory note at 10 (1982) (NAT’L CONFERENCE COMM’RS UNIF. STATE LAWS, 
amended 2014). 
70  Id. at 11. 
71  Id. 
72  Id. 
73  Id. 
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separate occupancy.74 The unit’s “owner must make the designated payments 
with respect to ‘other real estate described in a declaration;’ and (2) those pay-
ments must be mandatory.”75 These developments “thus exclude from UCIOA 
any development where there is no division of the property into ‘units’ and 
‘other real estate’ and any such development organized on a voluntary rather 
than compulsory membership basis.”76 
B. Everyone Has to Pay Their Dues: Unpaid Assessments and the Super-
Priority Lien 
Common-interest communities have historically imposed fees as a way to 
pay for community expenses such as property management, landscaping ser-
vice, utilities, and insurance, as well as community amenities such as clubhous-
es and pools.77 The drafters of the UCA, and later the UCIOA, foresaw that 
common-interest associations would need to protect their interest in these 
fees.78 Thus, the UCIOA included a way for the association to collect delin-
quent fees: the UCIOA allows common-interest associations who are owed fees 
to move into “super-priority” status ahead of other creditors by recouping un-
paid assessments in a foreclosure action.79 
A lien operates by attaching to a property and serving as a flag that the ti-
tleholder has an unpaid debt, and that the property is collateral for that debt.80 If 
the titleholder fails to repay what he owes, the lienholder may foreclose on the 
property, using the funds from the sale to attempt and recoup the cost of the 
debt.81 When multiple liens exist on a property, they are ranked in order to de-
termine who has priority in the repayment of the loans.82 The debt with the 
highest priority is the senior lienholder, and all other liens are junior to it.83 
Should a senior lienholder foreclose on the property, all junior liens are extin-
guished.84 However, if a junior lienholder forecloses, all senior liens remain in-
tact, and the property passes to the new owner burdened by these encumbranc-
es.85 The traditional order of liens under statutory law is as follows: real estate 
taxes, and after the taxes are paid, the first mortgage, followed by any second-
                                                        
74  Geis, supra note 64, at 759–60. 
75  Id. at 760. 
76  Id. 
77  See Goldmintz, supra note 42, at 268. 
78  Id. at 274. 
79  Gloeckner, supra note 4, at 329 (describing Nevada’s statutory super priority lien provi-
sion). 
80  Goldmintz, supra note 42, at 270. 
81  Id. 
82  Id. at 268–69. 
83  Id. at 269. 
84  Andrea J. Boyack & William E. Foster, Muddying the Waterfall: How Ambiguous Liabil-
ity Statutes Distort Creditor Priority in Condominium Foreclosures, 67 ARK. L. REV. 225, 
227 (2014). 
85  Id. at 234–36. 
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ary mortgages and all other liens.86 The prioritization of the mortgages is, in 
part, common sense—the mortgager typically has much more at stake than the 
other lienholders on the property, and common law has traditionally respected 
the principle of “first in time, first in right.”87 
The super-priority lien, however, breaks this traditional chain, allowing the 
HOA to assume position over the senior lienholders, both allowing foreclosure 
and extinguishing all subsequently subordinated liens.88 Proponents of the su-
per-priority lien assert that when one homeowner in a common owner associa-
tion defaults, the burden of the unpaid assessments then falls to the remaining 
owners.89 The HOA must either spread the cost to the homeowners or reduce 
the services and amenities it provides.90 Additionally, pro-HOA groups assert 
that by allowing the mortgager to remain senior in such situations, the harm to 
the community only multiplies.91 In a weak economy, a bank is incentivized to 
delay foreclosure proceedings until the market appears to recover, in order to 
get the biggest dollar amount possible.92 This delay causes delinquent assess-
ments to increase, furthering the burden on the association and community.93 
The UCIOA created a limited priority over mortgages in first-lien position, 
providing associations with six months’ worth of assessments due immediately 
upon a lien enforcement.94 UCIOA provisions were intended to provide balance 
between the protection of lenders’ security interests and the protection of the 
association’s deficient operating expenses.95 As of 2013, at least twenty juris-
dictions, including Nevada, have put a statutory provision in place to provide 
associations with super-priority position for at least six months of unpaid as-
sessments.96 In theory, this provision was meant to encourage banks to simply 
institute foreclosure proceedings and pay off the nominal amount owed to the 
associations.97 However, both the interpretations and implementation of the 
statutes have varied. The states differ widely on details, such as whether collec-
tion costs and attorneys’ fees are included in the liens, whether the lien assumes 
                                                        
86  Casey Perkins, Note, Privatopia in Distress: The Impact of the Foreclosure Crisis on 
Homeowners’ Associations, 10 NEV. L.J. 561, 569 (2010). 
87  Goldmintz supra note 42, at 270–71, 271 n.24. 
88  Perkins, supra note 86, at 569. 
89  Id. at 568. 
90  Boyack & Foster, supra note 84, at 239. 
91  Perkins, supra note 86, at 572–73. 
92  Id. at 570. 
93  Id. 
94  UCIOA § 3-116 (1982) (NAT’L CONFERENCE COMM’RS UNIF. STATE LAWS, amended 
2014); Goldmintz, supra note 42, at 268–69. 
95  UNIF. CONDO. ACT § 3-116 cmts. 1 & 2 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE 
LAWS 1980). 
96  JOINT EDITORIAL BD. FOR UNIF. REAL PROP. ACTS, THE SIX-MONTH “LIMITED PRIORITY 
LIEN” FOR ASSOCIATION FEES UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT 2–3 
(2013); Boyack & Foster, supra note 84, at 262. 
97  UNIF. CONDO. ACT § 3-116 cmt. 2 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE 
LAWS 1980). 
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priority over first and second position mortgages, and whether the statute ap-
plies to homeowners’ associations, condominium associations, or both.98 
These differences and the uncertainty over what exactly the super-priority 
lien guarantees have resulted in widely varying interpretations in legislatures 
and courts across the country.99 The Great Recession, followed by unemploy-
ment and foreclosures forced the vagueness surrounding the super-priority liens 
into the spotlight.100 To lend some clarity to this struggle, the UCIOA was 
amended in 2014 to clarify that the super-priority lien is a true lien, not merely 
a payment-priority lien, and that when an association forecloses on a property, 
the lender’s interest is not extinguished unless the association provided proper 
notice.101 
II. THE COURTS SPLIT: NEVADA AND THE SUPER-PRIORITY LIEN 
Nowhere was the debate about super-priority liens more heated than Neva-
da.102 In 1991, Nevada adopted and modified the UCIOA.103 The act was intro-
duced as Assembly Bill 221, and after adoption, introduced by the legislature as 
Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) Chapter 116, or the Nevada Uniform Common 
Interest Ownership Act.104 NRS 116 governs common-interest associations and 
states in part: 
A lien under this section is prior to all other liens and encumbrances on a unit 
except: . . . [a] first security interest on the unit recorded before the date on 
which the assessment sought to be enforced became delinquent or, in a coopera-
tive, the first security interest encumbering only the unit’s owner’s interest and 
perfected before the date on which the assessment sought to be enforced became 
delinquent . . . . A lien under this section is prior to all security interests de-
scribed in paragraph (b) of subsection 2 to the extent of: [a]ny charges incurred 
by the association on a unit pursuant to NRS 116.310312 [and to the extent of 
t]he unpaid amount of assessments, not to exceed an amount equal to assess-
ments for common expenses based on the periodic budget adopted by the asso-
ciation pursuant to NRS 116.3115 which would have become due in the absence 
of acceleration during the 9 months immediately preceding the date on which 
the notice of default and election to sell is recorded pursuant to paragraph (b) of 
subsection 1 of NRS 116.31162 . . . .”105 
Under NRS 116, nine months of delinquent assessments (six months prior 
to the statute’s amendment), places an HOA into first-lien position over a 
                                                        
98  Boyack & Foster, supra note 84, at 254–55, 254 n.164. 
99  See generally id. at 255–58. 
100  Aušra Gaigalaitė, Note, Priority of Condominium Associations’ Assessment Liens vis-à-
vis Mortgages: Navigating in the Super-Priority Lien Jurisdictions, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
841, 848 (2017). 
101  Id. 
102  See generally Gloeckner, supra note 4, at 327–28. 
103  Id. at 329. 
104  Id. 
105  NEV. REV. STAT. § 116.3116(2)–(3) (2017). 
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mortgage lender, enabling the HOA to institute a non-judicial foreclosure.106 
The foreclosure starts with the association recording a “notice of delinquent as-
sessment (‘NDA’).”107 Recording the NDA is optional, but most associations 
choose to record it.108 Within thirty days of the mailing of the NDA, the associ-
ation may record a “notice of default and election to sell the unit” (NOD).109 
Ninety days after the NOD is recorded, the association must give notice of the 
sale “in the manner and for a time not less than that required by law for the sale 
of real property upon execution.”110 The property is then sold at a cash auction 
to a third-party buyer who typically pays far below market value.111 Once the 
association receives the funds from the sale, the proceeds are applied as fol-
lows: 
“(1) The reasonable expenses of sale; (2) The reasonable expenses of securing 
possession before sale, holding, maintaining, and preparing the unit for sale, in-
cluding payment of taxes and other governmental charges, premiums on hazard 
and liability insurance, and, to the extent provided for by the declaration, rea-
sonable attorney’s fees and other legal expenses incurred by the association; (3) 
Satisfaction of the association’s lien; (4) Satisfaction in the order of priority of 
any subordinate claim of record; and (5) Remittance of any excess to the unit’s 
owner.”112 
Originally, the bank’s lien remained in place, and if the third-party buyer 
failed to satisfy this lien upon the purchase of the house, the bank would simply 
institute foreclosure proceedings upon the new owners.113 
In response to this process, both mortgage lenders and third-party buyers 
began to institute proceedings challenging the vagueness of NRS 116, which 
set forth the provisions for foreclosure proceedings.114 The first battle dealt 
with what types of costs could be included under the assessments.115 In 2006, 
prior to the enactment of nine months of unpaid assessments, the Court held in 
Korbel Family Trust v. Spring Mountain Ranch Master Ass’n that the six 
months of unpaid assessments could include interest, legal fees, and collection 
costs.116 In 2009, after complaints about excessive collection costs, the Nevada 
Legislature enacted a law limiting associations to fees “reasonable” to collect-
ing delinquent obligations.117 In 2012, the State of Nevada Department of 
                                                        
106  See Gloeckner, supra note 4, at 330. 
107  Id. at 333. 
108  Id. 
109  Id. 
110  Id. 
111  Id. at 328. 
112  Id. at 333 (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. § 116.31164(3)(c) (2017)). 
113  Id. at 334. 
114  Id. 
115  Id. at 330. 
116  Id. at 330 (citing Order, Korbel Family Trust v. Spring Mountain Ranch Master Ass’n, 
No. 06-A-523959-C (Nev. Dist. Ct. Dec. 22, 2006)). 
117  Id. at 330–31. 
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Business and Industry, Real Estate Division (“NRED”), issued an advisory 
opinion stating that “costs of collecting” are not included in a lien under NRS 
116.3116.118 If the association incurs more than nine months of delinquent as-
sessments and other costs associated with the foreclosure process, the home-
owner becomes personally liable for the expenses.119 If the homeowner fails to 
pay these expenses, the HOA is limited to recouping its costs from the foreclo-
sure sale.120 
The second issue to be widely litigated was whether the mortgage lender’s 
lien survived the super-priority lien, or whether it was extinguished in the fore-
closure, allowing the third-party buyer to assume title free of encumbrances.121 
The litigants were split into two groups: the first group supported the interests 
of the HOAs and the third-party buyers, and argued that the bank’s liens were 
extinguished in the foreclosure.122 The second group supported the interests of 
the banks and argued that the subordinate liens survived the foreclosure—
giving banks both the potential to collect some proceeds from the auction and 
the right to foreclose on the third-party buyer should they fail to satisfy the 
property’s existing encumbrances.123 
Nevada courts interpreting NRS 116 were split into pro-HOA and pro-bank 
camps as well.124 The courts debated over the language of NRS 116, with the 
pro-HOA litigants arguing that because the CC&Rs were recorded prior to the 
lender recording the deed of trust, the HOAs’ liens were “first in time and, 
therefore, first in right.”125 However, pro-bank courts asserted that a first mort-
gage that is recorded prior to a deficiency in the assessments assumes seniority 
to all except the nine months of delinquent assessments.126 
Additionally, the courts have looked to legislative intent in trying to deter-
mine how to interpret NRS 116.127 From 1991 to 2009, the legislature did not 
make any changes to the super-priority-lien language, with the exception of the 
                                                        
118  Nev. Dep’t of Bus. & Indus., Real Estate Div., Advisory No. 13-01, The Super Priority 
Lien at 10 (Dec. 12, 2012). 
119  Press Release, Nev. Dep’t of Bus. & Indus., Real Estate Division Issues Super Priority 
Lien Advisory Opinion (Dec. 13, 2012), http://business.nv.gov/News_Media/Press_Releases 
/2012/Real_Estate/Real_Estate_Division_Issues_Super_Priority_Lien_Advisory_Opinion/ [ 
https://perma.cc/P82N-Q6V9]. 
120  Id. 
121  Gloeckner, supra note 4, at 335. 
122  See Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at para. 17, First 100, LLC v. Burns, 
No. 13A677693 (Nev. Dist. Ct. May 31, 2013), 2013 WL 8365157, at *4; Gloeckner, supra 
note 4, at 335. 
123  Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 122, at para. 17; Gloeckner, 
supra note 4, at 335. 
124  Gloeckner, supra note 4, at 335. 
125  Appellant’s Opening Brief at 14, SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. Bank of Am., N.A., 334 P.3d 
408 (Nev. 2014) (No. 63313). 
126  Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Alessi & Koenig, LLC, 962 F. Supp. 2d. 1222, 1225 
(D. Nev. 2013). 
127  Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 122, at para. 33. 
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increase from six months to nine.128 Because the language of NRS 116 was 
nearly identical to the UCIOA, courts studied the comments of the UCIOA for 
clarity.129 Section 3-116, Official Comment 1 states that the holder of the senior 
lien could simply pay the delinquent assessments, thus preventing foreclosure 
and maintaining their own interests.130 However, the drafters either failed to in-
clude or purposely omitted any mention of extinguishment should the first lien-
holder fail to pay the HOA’s assessments.131 
Even seeking out clarity from one of the UCIOA drafters failed to resolve 
the issue. The Common-Interest Committee of the Real Property Section of the 
Nevada State Bar (“Committee”) sought direction from Carl H. Lisman, one of 
the UCIOA’s drafters.132 In a letter to the Committee, Lisman stated “[t]he as-
sociation enjoys a statutory limited priority ahead of a first security interest 
similar to the priority given to property taxes and other governmental charges. 
Because of the statutory priority, foreclosure by the association extinguishes 
the first security interest and all other junior interests.”133 
Although clear, pro-bank groups assert that Lisman’s letter establishes that 
extinguishment is only proper when the bank has been properly joined or noti-
fied, ignoring the fact that under the Statute, notice to the lender is not re-
quired.134 Additionally, pro-bank groups assert that, as Lisman’s letter conflicts 
with the UCIOA’s official comments, it should be disregarded by courts.135 
Conversely, pro-HOA groups argued that pursuant to NRS 40.462, NRS 
107.080, or NRS 107A.260, any foreclosure sale extinguishes junior liens.136 
Because NRS 116 was enacted after NRS 40.462 and NRS 107A.260 and fails 
to mention extinguishment, the legislators must have intended that foreclosures 
pursuant to NRS 116 be conducted the same as all other foreclosures.137 
                                                        
128  Gloeckner, supra note 4, at 337–38. 
129  Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 122, at para. 23–25. 
130  Id. at para. 42. 
131  Gloeckner, supra note 4, at 338. 
132  Letter from Carl H. Lisman, Comm’r, Unif. Law Comm’n, to Michael E. Buckley & Ka-
ren D. Dennison, Co-Chairs, Common-Interest Comm., Nev. State Bar Real Prop. Section, 
(May 29, 2013), https://www.nvbar.org/wp-content/uploads/RP_Lisman%20on%20Super%2 
0Priority%20May%202013.pdf [https://perma.cc/48LY-RNXL]. 
133  Id. 
134  Gloeckner, supra note 4, at 339. 
135  Amicus Curiae Brief of the Nevada Bankers Association in Support of Motion to Dis-
miss at 30, SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. A-13-678858-C (Nev. 
Dist. Ct. Aug. 1, 2013), 2013 WL 12357521. 
136  Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 122, at para. 30 (“For exam-
ple, the holder of a mortgage may initiate a judicial foreclosure via NRS 40.430 et seq. The 
holder of a deed of trust may also initiate a non-judicial foreclosure (commonly known as a 
‘Trustee’s Sale’) pursuant to NRS 107.080 et seq. A landlord . . . may also seek the appoint-
ment of a receiver to initiate a foreclosure upon a security instrument pursuant to NRS 
107A.260.”). 
137  Id. at para. 33. 
19 NEV. L.J. 313, CROOKER 3/24/2019  5:10 PM 
Fall 2018] HEY, NEIGHBOR 327 
 
Furthermore, courts have considered public policy when raising a flag in 
either the pro-HOA or pro-bank camp.138 Proponents of the HOAs have argued 
that because NRS 116 requires associations to provide multiple notices to lend-
ers, the banks have time to intervene in any proceedings.139 The NRS sets forth 
the requirements for non-judicial foreclosures as: (a) “thirty days between mail-
ing the notice of delinquent assessments and recording and mailing of the no-
tice of default and election to sell”;140 (b) “ninety days between recording and 
mailing the notice of default and recording and mailing the notice of sale”;141 
and (c) “twenty-one days[’] notice between the notice of sale and the actual 
sale.”142 Additionally, the HOA’s notice of Trustee’s Sale informs lenders: 
“WARNING! A SALE OF YOUR PROPERTY IS IMMINENT! UNLESS 
YOU PAY THE AMOUNT SPECIFIED IN THIS NOTICE BEFORE THE 
SALE DATE, YOU COULD LOSE YOUR HOME, EVEN IF THE AMOUNT 
IS IN DISPUTE. YOU MUST ACT BEFORE THE SALE DATE. IF YOU 
HAVE ANY QUESTIONS, PLEASE CALL (name and telephone number of 
the contact person for the association). IF YOU NEED ASSISTANCE, PLEASE 
CALL THE FORECLOSURE SECTION OF THE OMBUDSMAN’S OFFICE, 
NEVADA REAL ESTATE DIVISION, AT (toll-free telephone number desig-
nated by the Division) IMMEDIATELY.”143 
Banks argue that it is grossly unfair for a third-party buyer to obtain a 
property for a nominal amount, thereby extinguishing a lien that could poten-
tially be worth far more.144 In response, the HOAs assert that the unfairness lies 
in letting an innocent third-party obtain a property only to have the bank fore-
close on it once more.145 To this, lenders assert that a third-party buyer should 
be savvy enough to understand that the amount paid for the property is almost 
certainly less than what is needed to satisfy any encumbrances, and they should 
therefore take into consideration the fact that they could potentially lose the 
property.146 Proponents of bank interests further argue that the delinquent as-
sessments are almost always a nominal amount in comparison to the existing 
mortgage, and that rather than creating a court system where banks feel com-
pelled to foreclose at the first sign of trouble, instead, banks should be incentiv-
ized to help homeowners remain in their property.147 Furthermore, “[t]he ser-
vices provided by an HOA are luxuries, not necessities,” and HOAs both 
                                                        
138  Gloeckner, supra note 4, at 343. 
139  Appellant’s Opening Brief, at 33, SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. US Bank, N.A., 334 P.3d 
408 (Nev. 2014) (No. 63078). 
140  Id. at 34 (citing NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 116.31162(1)(b)–(c), 116.31163, 116.31168 (2017)). 
141  Id. (citing NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 116.311635, 116.31163, 116.31168 (2017)). 
142  Id. (citing NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 116.311635(1)(a), 21.130(1)(c) (2017)). 
143  Id. at 36 (citing NEV. REV. STAT. § 116.311635(3)(b) (2017)). 
144  See Gloeckner, supra note 4, at 345. 
145  Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 122, at para. 39. 
146  Id. at para. 40. 
147  Premier One Holdings, Inc. v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, No. 2:13-cv-895-JCM 
(GWF), 2013 WL 4048573, at *5 (D. Nev. Aug. 9, 2013). 
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provide the least amount of services to a homeowner and assume the least 
amount of risk in comparison to other lenders.148 
A. The Judicial System Provides Clarity? 
Finally, on September 18, 2014, in SFR Investments Pool 1 v. U.S. Bank, 
the Nevada Supreme Court resolved the dispute, decisively ruling that a super-
priority lien is a true lien in first position, rather than a first payment position, 
and that even a non-judicial foreclosure extinguishes a mortgager’s claim.149 
The Court’s opinion stated that the HOA lien is divided into two pieces, the 
“super-priority piece” and the “sub-priority piece.”150 The super-priority lien is 
the piece that is the true lien, and includes the nine months of unpaid assess-
ments, maintenance, and nuisance-abatement charges.151 The sub-priority 
piece, however, is subordinate to the mortgage, and includes all other fees and 
assessments owed to the HOA.152 
The Court, however, failed to discuss what would happen if the bank did 
not receive notice, or if the HOA was uncooperative in either communication 
or the reasonableness of the amounts demanded.153 Furthermore, the Court 
failed to discuss the validity of HOA foreclosures where the bank attempts to 
settle the amount owed and the HOA refuses to comply.154 The Court also did 
not clarify if banks could take any action against third-party buyers.155 In re-
sponse, the Governor of Nevada signed Senate Bill 306, which drastically 
changed foreclosure proceedings when it took effect in October 2015.156 The 
law created a sixty-day redemption period after a foreclosure sale for both 
homeowners and lenders, clarified the amounts that could be included in the 
super-priority lien, and mandated that associations notify subordinate lienhold-
ers of the foreclosure proceedings.157 
Complicating matters further, in Bourne Valley v. Wells Fargo, the Ninth 
Circuit interpreted the pre-2015 NRS statute, which required lenders to “opt-in” 
for affirmative notices regarding foreclosures in favor of banks.158 In Bourne, 
an HOA foreclosed on a property that was delinquent on assessment fees, and 
the property was sold at auction and the interest conveyed to Bourne Valley 
                                                        
148  Id. 
149  SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 334 P.3d 408, 413–14 (Nev. 2014). 
150  Id. at 411. 
151  Id. 
152  Id. 
153  Gloeckner, supra note 4, at 348. 
154  Id. 
155  Id. 
156  Gaigalaitė, supra note 100, at 855. 
157  See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 116.3116–116.31168 (2017); S.B. 306, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Nev. 2015). 
158  See Bourne Valley Court Tr. v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 832 F.3d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 
2016). 
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Court Trust.159 Bourne Valley attempted to file a quiet title action, and the dis-
trict court ruled that in accordance with the Court’s decision in SFR, Wells Far-
go’s interest was extinguished by the foreclosure.160 When the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals heard the case, they derided the burden placed on lenders to 
stay abreast of potential delinquencies in property-holders’ HOA fees.161 The 
Ninth Circuit was puzzled “[h]ow the mortgage lender, which likely had no re-
lationship with the homeowners’ association, should have known to ask [about 
potential delinquencies] . . . .”162 The Ninth Circuit ultimately held that the pre-
2015 statute did not incorporate the notice requirements from NRS 107.090.163 
This distinction led the Court to declare that NRS 116 was a facially unconsti-
tutional violation of mortgage lenders’ due process rights, and that the mere en-
actment of the statute was enough to satisfy the state action requirement.164 
The Nevada Supreme Court, in Saticoy Bay v. Wells Fargo, expressly de-
clined to follow the Ninth Circuit’s Bourne Valley decision.165 The Court held 
that neither the Due Process or Takings Clause of the Constitution were impli-
cated in HOA nonjudicial foreclosures, but did not determine whether NRS 116 
incorporated the notice requirements in NRS 107.090.166 However, the Nevada 
Supreme Court did agree to answer the certified question of: 
“Whether NRS § 116.31168(1)’s incorporation of NRS § 107.090 required a 
homeowner’s [sic] association to provide notices of default and/or sale to per-
sons or entities holding a subordinate interest even when such persons or entities 
did not request notice, prior to the amendments that took effect on Oct 1, 
2015?”167 
While awaiting the answer to this question, the potential resolution did 
nothing to lessen the existing strain on the court system. Because of the split in 
authority, many cases that were already years into litigation were stayed await-
ing the Court’s opinion.168 
                                                        
159  Id. 
160  Id. at 1156–57. 
161  Id. at 1158. 
162  Id. 
163  Id. at 1159. See also NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.090 (2017) (requiring that notice of default 
be sent to “[e]ach person who has recorded a request for a copy of the notice; and [e]ach 
other person with an interest whose interest or claimed interest is subordinate to the deed of 
trust.”). 
164  Bourne Valley Court Tr., 832 F.3d at 1160. 
165  Saticoy Bay LLC Series 350 Durango 104 v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 388 P.3d 970, 
974 n.5 (Nev. 2017). 
166  Id. at 971, 974. 
167  Order Accepting Certified Question, Directing Briefing and Directing Submission of Fil-
ing Fee, SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. 72931 (Nev. Jun. 13, 2017). 
168  See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. King, No. 2:17-cv-01102-JAD-GWF, 2017 WL 
5466617, at *3 (D. Nev. Nov. 14, 2017) (order staying case and denying motion for sum-
mary judgment); Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Trust, No. 2:16-cv-02721-JAD-GWF, 2017 WL 
5466616, at *3 (D. Nev. Nov. 14, 2017) (order staying case and denying all pending mo-
tions); Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Northgate Homeowners Ass’n, No. 2:17-cv-02192-JAD-
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The Court eventually answered that NRS 116 had incorporated the notice 
provisions of NRS 107.090 and required that notice be provided to all persons 
whose liens were subordinate to the super-priority lien.169 However, this did not 
mean that the express notice provisions of NRS 116—requiring notice be pro-
vided to those who had previously opted in—were rendered superfluous.170 Ra-
ther, those who could choose to opt-in to notice were not necessarily the same 
as required to receive notice; therefore both the opt-in and express notice pro-
visions served a specific purpose.171 This, the Court stated, “eliminated the re-
dundancy of both incorporating NRS 107.090 and requiring notice to all known 
lienholders . . . .”172 Thus, NRS 116’s incorporation of NRS 107.090 included 
the mandate to provide notice to all subordinate interests.173 The Court declined 
to address the issue of whether notice was properly given; however, the issue of 
whether NRS 116 deprived banks of due process was neatly dismissed.174 With 
the resolution of this question, Nevada continues its creeping towards resolu-
tion of the super-priority chaos, one issue at a time. 
III. BANKS HAVE RIGHTS. HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS HAVE RIGHTS. 
WHAT ABOUT THE HOMEOWNERS? 
With the abundance of litigation regarding HOAs, banks, and super-
priority liens and the questionable violation of home lenders’ constitutional 
rights, it is easy to overlook the potential violations of homeowners’ rights. 
Although Nevada legislation recognizes that one’s home is his castle,175 that 
refrain loses its luster when the castle resides within the confines of a common-
interest community. For better or worse, an individual seeking to buy a home in 
the Las Vegas metro area will likely have no choice but to purchase a home 
that is controlled by an HOA.176 Although it is unknown how many communi-
ties exist in Nevada, as of December 2017, 3,201 HOAs were registered with 
                                                                                                                                
GWF, 2017 WL 5466615, at *3 (D. Nev. Nov. 14, 2017) (order staying case and denying all 
pending motions); Ditech Fin. LLC v. Res. Grp. LLC, No. 2:17-cv-01823-JAD-CWH, 2017 
WL 5467729, at *3 (D. Nev. Nov. 14, 2017) (order staying case and denying pending mo-
tions); Ditech Fin. LLC v. Lockmor Holdings, LLC, No. 2:17-cv-01829-JAD-PAL, 2017 
WL 5467732, at *3 (D. Nev. Nov. 14, 2017) (order staying case and denying pending mo-
tions). The District Court stayed these cases on the same day due to the authority split and 
awaited the Nevada Supreme Court decision. 
169  SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 422 P.3d 1248, 1252 (Nev. 2018). 
170  Id. 
171  Id. 
172  Id. at 1252 n.4. 
173  Id. 
174  Id. at 1250 n.2, 1251, 1253 n.5. 
175  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.120 (2017) (the Castle Doctrine). 
176  See Chadderdon, supra note 34, at 237–39. 
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the state Ombudsman, and from July through December, twenty-seven new as-
sociations were listed.177 
Even if an individual chooses to purchase a home in a common-interest 
community, her daily life could be drastically impacted should the board of di-
rectors change or impose new rules. Although the regulations that guaranteed 
homogeny were an initial factor in the attractiveness of early common-interest 
communities, today the amount of control exercised by HOAs is staggering. 
Actions that would be constitutional violations if committed by a state govern-
ment are allowable because they are conducted within a private neighbor-
hood.178 While the Fourth Amendment protects private citizens against unrea-
sonable search and seizure by a public officer, those same protections do not 
extend to a private security guard employed by the community.179 Neither does 
the Fourth Amendment protect homeowners from their HOA ordering a search 
when a resident is reportedly a “hoarder.”180 
What about First Amendment rights? Free speech doesn’t seem to be a pri-
ority within many communities, as many HOAs prohibit residents from placing 
any kind of sign on their front yards.181 Furthermore, even the existence of gat-
ed communities may impinge on the Constitutional right to travel by preventing 
“outsiders” from accessing what once were public streets, an issue that was liti-
gated in Citizens Against Gated Enclaves v. Whitney Heights Civic Ass’n.182 
There, the court held that a street lined with historic homes could only be re-
moved from public use if unnecessary for transit; and the street in question was 
deemed necessary.183 “The streets of a city belong to the people of the state, 
and the use thereof is an inalienable right of every citizen . . . .”184 
Additionally, the basic concept of living in a community where individuals 
are forced to conform to a set of rules by established individuals who may or 
may not possess a drop of originality (or taste, for that matter) overlooks the 
                                                        
177  NEV. DEP’T OF BUS. & INDUS. REAL ESTATE DIV., COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES AND 
CONDOMINIUM HOTELS OMBUDSMAN’S OFFICE REPORTING PERIOD JULY 1–DECEMBER 31, 
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against a gated community for discrimination, exclusion, or a violation of civil rights and 
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181  Chadderdon, supra note 34, at 234. 
182  Citizens Against Gated Enclaves v. Whitney Heights Civic Ass’n, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 451, 
453 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). 
183  Id. at 445. 
184  Id. at 454 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Cty. Of Contra Costa, 154 Cal. Rptr. 374 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1979)). 
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truth that our country is far from homogenous. The very differences that HOAs 
are designed to quash have led to many of the nation’s greatest achievements. 
Furthermore, in a community where external perfection is demanded, and fail-
ure to adhere is met with fines (and potentially foreclosure), it is easy to forget 
that the residents are individuals with struggles, such that a weed-free yard may 
not be first on their list of priorities. 
A. HOAs Gone Wild 
HOAs frequently enforce rules that would otherwise be clear constitutional 
violations if committed by a state agency. Even apart from the constitutional 
aspect, the examples of HOAs promulgating regulations that lack common 
sense are, unfortunately, easy to find and range from the ridiculous to the trag-
ic. 
In Palm Springs, California, a HOA imposed a conduct code that held resi-
dents responsible for their own behavior, as well as the behavior of their guests 
and even vendors.185 One resident was charged fifty-dollars when her carpet 
installer was caught driving seven miles over the thirty-five miles per hour 
speed limit.186 Although homeowners complained that they should not be held 
accountable for the behavior of a third party, the HOA responded by purchas-
ing a radar gun.187 
In Tennessee, a three-year-old girl was nearly strangled to death by the 
cord on the blinds mandated by the neighborhood HOA.188 Her family spent 
several thousand dollars fighting the association about the requirement, and af-
ter losing chose to move to a neighborhood without an HOA.189 
After losing a leg when he stepped on a landmine, a Georgia Purple Heart 
veteran was confined to a wheelchair and subsequently gifted a home where he 
raises two children.190 However, his failure to properly edge his yard and his 
placement of trash cans in a location easily accessed in a wheelchair led to his 
HOA assessing thousands of dollars in fines and attorney’s fees and placing a 
lien on his home.191 
A California homeowner had her home burglarized, and accordingly re-
quested additional outdoor lights—a request denied by her HOA.192 After 
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choosing to install the lights anyway, the HOA forced her to dismantle them, a 
process which required her to shut off all other outdoor lights.193 The night the 
lights were shut down, a burglar again broke into her home, robbing and raping 
her.194 
These stories illustrate the horror that can arise from living in a community 
whose directors lack common sense. However, there are less dramatic stories 
about individuals who are ordered to paint their homes or make repairs and lack 
the financial means to do so. Should a homeowner be jailed for failing to com-
ply with his HOA’s landscaping mandates, after an increase in his adjustable 
rate mortgage left him short on cash?195 Is it right for a man to lose his home 
after incurring fines for planting too many roses?196 Should a woman whose 
husband is serving in Iraq be fined $1,000 for displaying a sign that says “Sup-
port Our Troops”?197 Is it right for a woman raising five foster children to face 
eviction, because the association equated her state aid of $2,028 a month with 
running a business?198 Every story features real people who have faced real dis-
tress as a result of their HOA. 
At the heart of Nevada’s super-priority epidemic are the people who have 
lost their homes. Some homeowners certainly made poor financial choices, 
overextending themselves and purchasing homes in communities that were far 
too expensive. However, the above stories illustrate the plethora of reasons that 
HOAs can and do impose fines, adding exponentially to the burdens of individ-
uals already struggling. 
B. Hands in the Cookie Jar 
In addition to promulgating rules that defy common sense, HOAs, by na-
ture, provide a large opportunity for financial abuse, a situation that seems to 
occur far too often in Nevada. In Las Vegas, two homeowners, one of them a 
board member, living in an age-qualified community became suspicious that 
the HOA was not returning excess dues to its homeowners.199 The men unwise-
ly chose to lodge an allegation of forgery with the local police, and after con-
ducting an investigation, the police arrested the two homeowners for lodging a 
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false complaint.200 However, the IRS conducted an audit of the HOA and de-
termined that the association was in fact holding funds that should have been 
returned to the homeowners, in excess of $1 million.201 
In another instance, a common-interest association manager embezzled 
$1.6 million from various HOAs by using electronic signatures to transfer 
money not approved by HOA boards into her own business accounts.202 Yet 
another property manager hired by an HOA wrote checks to her construction 
company for work done to the community properties.203 The checks were 
signed by herself and a man who she claimed was an HOA board member.204 
However, far from being a homeowner—his association with the community 
was limited to the janitorial services he provided to them.205 
The biggest scandal to rock the common-interest communities occurred 
when a local construction boss, Leon Benzer, was convicted of accomplishing 
HOA takeovers by hiring straw men to apply for board positions, and then rig-
ging the elections to ensure his candidates were elected.206 The HOAs then pro-
ceeded to engage in construction defect litigation, directing the cases towards 
law firms complicit in the arrangement.207 The corrupt boards would then hire 
Benzer’s construction company who, rather than fixing the alleged defects, 
passed the funds along to Benzer instead.208 
C. No More Block Parties 
In addition to presenting opportunities for fraud, common-interest commu-
nities often serve to deter the creation of what their name would suggest: com-
munity.209 Planned developments originally gained popularity in part because 
of the homogeneity that they provided; soon, communities realized that they 
could use the restrictive covenant to control not just the appearance of homes, 
but of the residents as well. The restrictive covenant “runs with the land” and 
has the power to bind future homeowners to its provisions. At one point, cove-
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nants were created that prohibited non-white families from purchasing homes 
in certain neighborhoods, and this practice continued until 1948 when the Su-
preme Court, in Shelley v. Kraemer, expanded the state action doctrine to pro-
vide that courts could not enforce racially restrictive covenants.210 
However, the sentiments that existed in 1948 still manifest themselves in 
common-interest communities today. Although communities may not be for 
“whites only,” the mentality of “us versus them” is alive and well.211 The de-
cline of the middle class has sparked a fear to preserve “niceness,” a concern 
that notably is more prominent “for those who only recently attained middle- 
class status.”212 Furthermore, communities with more prominent social and cul-
tural diversity tend to have more rules and regulations.213 Some communities 
have rules preventing trucks, discouraging residents who work in labor posi-
tions.214 Gates, both literal and figurative, exist to keep “us” from “them,” both 
inside and outside the community.215 One author aptly describes the common-
interest community as “a metaphor to describe the two Americas.”216 
Although some scholars have suggested that common-interest communities 
be subject to the analysis in Marsh v. Alabama, courts have been reticent to 
consider common-interest communities and HOAs as state actors, and thus sub-
ject to the same Constitutional limits as a municipality.217 The rationale under-
lying courts’ reluctance to apply significant restraints to HOAs arises partly out 
of the freedom to contract.218 The theory is that individuals choose to reside in 
common-interest communities, and by entering into a contract with an HOA 
freely choose to be bound by its terms.219 
This logic however, only prevails if individuals have a choice to purchase 
in a non-HOA community, and if individuals are fully aware of the rights they 
are relinquishing to their neighbors when they choose to purchase within an 
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HOA community. Yet, with planned communities becoming the norm, the 
choice whether to reside in a common-interest community is becoming non-
existent.220 Furthermore, many individuals have stated that they were unaware 
of the scope of their community’s CC&Rs when they purchased their home.221 
IV. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
While HOAs do serve some positive roles, such as alleviating some of the 
burden from local municipalities and providing communities with assurances of 
a stable neighborhood aesthetic, they also possess the power to infringe on 
many individual rights.222 The super-priority lien epidemic in Nevada demon-
strates how much power these associations have, and how frequently the power 
is wielded.223 The question now becomes: how do we move forward? It is un-
likely that developers and cities will suddenly decide to cease the construction 
of common-interest communities, and the judicial system has thus far shown 
itself unwilling to drastically curtail the HOA’s reach. The task, then, falls to 
our legislature to consider implementing safeguards which would not strip 
HOAs of their power, but rather ensure that the rights and power of the HOA 
and the homeowner are equitably balanced. 
A.  The Path Forward is Paved with Legislation 
One approach to constrain HOAs is to adopt the approach proffered by the 
Restatement (Third) of Property. The Restatement would dictate that HOAs 
“treat members fairly” and that they “act reasonably in the exercising of its dis-
cretionary powers including rulemaking, enforcement, and design-control pow-
ers.”224 Additionally, the Restatement would constrain HOAs to “govern the 
use of individually owned property to protect the common property.”225 Fur-
thermore, HOA boards would only possess the power to “adopt reasonable 
rules designed to . . . protect community members from unreasonable interfer-
ence in the enjoyment of their individual lots or units and the common property 
caused by use of other individually owned lots or units . . . .”226 HOAs would 
lack the power to inhibit “the use or occupancy of, or behavior within” a home, 
unless authorized by the master declaration.227 
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Other scholars have suggested practical approaches to the HOA dilemma, 
several of which Nevada would be wise to consider. First, the State should re-
quire that all HOA board members undertake annual ethics and financial train-
ing.228 This would ensure that board members otherwise unsuited to run a large 
community would at least have a foundation of knowledge about their respon-
sibilities to their community members.229 Furthermore, every HOA should be 
required to build into their budget a portion that would pay for regular third-
party audits.230 The results of the audit and a breakdown of how the communi-
ty’s funds are being spent should be distributed to each homeowner. This 
would both provide board members with accountability, and homeowners with 
transparency. 
Finally, Nevada should create a statutory memorialization of homeowners’ 
rights. Because courts have been reluctant to assign HOAs the same limitations 
that municipalities are bound by, it is difficult for a homeowner to prevail 
should they challenge their board of directors about an alleged violation.231 Ne-
vada is a national example of the legal maelstrom that can be created by an im-
balance of power between homeowners and HOAs.232 The reality exists that 
HOAs in Nevada, as well as the rest of the country, do commit acts that would 
be Constitutional violations if undertaken by a state government.233 The irony 
of this situation is that federal courts have recognized that HOAs violated 
banks’ rights by not providing notice of an impending foreclosure. How then, 
can the State ignore the infringement of individual rights committed by HOAs? 
To combat this situation, the State must recognize that homeowners have 
specific rights upon which HOAs cannot encroach, and that can be enforced in 
a court of law if necessary.234 These rights need not be as broad as those grant-
ed by the Constitution, but they should include a right to free speech, or expres-
sion.235 This right should allow homeowners some limited ability to share their 
beliefs with the outside world.236 This freedom need not allow a resident to 
cover their yard with hundreds of political signs or paint a flag on their garage, 
but it should create a limited ability for individual expression.237 Homeowners 
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should be free to support the troops, advertise their candidate of choice in the 
upcoming election, or express their spirituality.238 
States must also recognize a right to privacy.239 The State should expressly 
recognize that the HOA can constrain only the exterior of a property. Anything 
that occurs within the house—any activity, decoration, or paraphernalia—
should be entirely within the control of the homeowner and not subject to 
comment or criticism by the HOA.240 Homeowners can build forts in their en-
tryway, walk around naked, invite company over for weeks at a time, and hang 
purple curtains in the living room if that is how they wish to spend their time 
and money. These two simple rights would provide homeowners some choice 
whether to conform to a sterile aesthetic or to maintain some enjoyment in the 
property that they own. These rights, coupled with the reasonableness require-
ments suggested by the Restatement, would serve to provide balance to com-
mon-interest communities and restore to homeowners a little of the freedom 
intended by purchasing land in fee simple absolute. 
CONCLUSION 
Nevada is a perfect example of the widespread problems that can result 
when homeowners’ associations wield too much power. Super-priority liens 
have been litigated for years, and still, associations, banks, and homeowners are 
uncertain of what will happen in the event of an HOA foreclosure. Even those 
who have not faced a nonjudicial foreclosure or do not live in a common-
interest community have been affected. A recent study showed that HOA fore-
closures have reduced property values in Nevada’s two most populated coun-
ties by over $1 billion.241 Homes foreclosed by an HOA in Clark County over 
the last few years were sold at an average discount of 42 percent.242 Thankfully, 
home values in Nevada have begun to increase, and HOA foreclosures did 
begin to slow slightly after the Court’s decision in SFR.243 The dust is begin-
ning to settle: now is the time to step back and look at the big picture. Nevada’s 
unique situation perfectly captures the irony of the HOA: organizations that 
were originally created to preserve the value of neighborhoods now are con-
tributing to a decrease in neighborhood values because of their active role in 
the foreclosure process.244 The potential for harm—to homeowners, banks, and 
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the economy—will always exist so long as HOAs exercise too much control. 
This problem cannot be allowed to continue. 
Although Nevada has made some efforts towards correcting the existing 
imbalance of power, such as the creation of the Office of Ombudsman, it is not 
enough.245 HOAs will always hold the upper hand until the State recognizes 
that homeowners have rights that demand to be enforced. And, ultimately, so 
too do HOAs. The ultimate goal should not be to put the reins solely into the 
hands of homeowners, but rather to distribute power equally. At the end of the 
day, for every horror story of an HOA run by blue-haired busybodies who seek 
to strip their communities of any trace of personality, there is an HOA truly 
committed to keeping its community a pleasant place to live. HOAs exist for 
the purpose of maintaining common spaces, protecting property values, and 
eliminating major problems that could become a neighborhood nuisance. 
Should the power between homeowners and HOAs be equally shared, there is a 
better chance of this purpose being achieved. Will communities remain shining 
pictures of homogeny? Probably not. Hopefully not. But, the destruction of per-
fection may serve a more important goal—people may just have to talk to each 
other and relearn how to resolve issues amongst themselves, rather than run-
ning to their board of directors. And perhaps, in letting go of perfection, com-
mon-interest communities will regain community. 
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